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As discrimination grounds 'sexual orientation' and 'civil status' have some things in
common. Both refer to characteristics of persons as well as of relationships (additionally
'sexual orientation' refers also to characteristics of intimate feelings and of erotic activity).
Both are not explicitly included in most international lists of forbidden grounds of
discrimination.
The only relevant grounds in this context listed by the main human rights treaties
are 'sex', 'birth' and 'other status' (articles 2 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights; article 2 of the International Covenant on Cultural Economic and
Social Rights; article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights; article 2 of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; the American Convention on Human
Rights talks of 'sex', 'birth' and 'other social condition' in article 1; all these are based on
article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). The Treaty establishing the
European Community will soon (after the Treaty of Amsterdam) have an article 141
(replacing article 119) referring to 'male and female workers', as well as a new article 13
(previously know as 6a) explicitly referring to 'sex' and 'sexual orientation', but still
omitting civil status. The various EC directives on equal treatment do refer to 'marital or
family status', but only as examples of indirect sex discrimination. Most countries of the
European Union now have anti-discrimination legislation referring to sexual orientation
(France, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Netherlands, Finland, Spain, Luxembourg; see
Waaldijk 1993, p. 79-81, and Wintemute 1997, p. xi and 266), but as far as I know only the
Netherlands has legislation with 'civil status' as an independent ground (see the General
Equal Treatment Act, articles 1 to 7; the corresponding provision of the Penal Code,
articles 429quater, does not refer to 'civil status').
Furthermore, both grounds are highly controversial given the dominance of
religions that favour (at least for the purposes of sex, procreation, domestic arrangements,
etc.) a particular civil status and a particular sexual orientation. And for both no clear
consensus exists as to what variations are covered by the terms.
Sexual orientation is closely linked to sex-as-gender: it is about the sex/gender of actual or
preferred (emotional-sexual) partners (W'mtemute 1997, p.6-7). Homosexual orientation is
about partners of the same sex/gender; heterosexual orientation is about partners of
different sexes/genders; and bisexual orientation is about partners of either sex/gender.
It has also been suggested that there are 'sexual orientations' that are not linked to
sex-as-gender, but only to sex-as-erotic-activity (e.g. paedophilia, sado-masochism, etc.),
Analytically or linguistically, that does not make sense (the resulting confusion is being
enhanced by using the ambiguous word 'sexuality' as a synonym for 'sexual orientation',
which unfortunately is gaining popularity among Anglo-American lesbian and gay
activists). However, it may be politically useful to include these phenomena in the term
'sexual orientation' (surprisingly the European Court of Human Rights has included sado-
masochist preferences, if not acts, in the term 'sexual orientation'; LasIritY, Jaggard andBrown
v. the United Kmgdom,judgement of 19 February 1997, par. 36). Conversely, the term can
also be stretched so as to include transsexuality and cross-dressing, phenomena that are not
linked to sex-as-erotic-activity (seefor example Heinze 1995, p. 59-60). Given the inclusion
of transsexuality in the term 'sex' by the Court ofJustice of the EC (P. o. S. and Cornwall
Counry Council,judgement of 30 April 1996, case C-13/94) as well as by national courts (e.g.
Court of Appeal of Leeuwarden, 13January 1995,NederlandseJurisprudentie 1995, nr. 243)
and by the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission (opinions 98-12 and 98-32), it is hardly
necessary anymore to include it in 'sexual orientation'.
Civil status primarily refers to whether or not someoneis (or was) married to someone else
(marital status). Consequently (11-) legitimacy (being born in or outside marriage) also
counts as a civil status (Heringa 1994, p. 41). In a wider sense the term is sometimes also
used to refer to other family law statuses or even to nationality.
As forbidden ground for discrimination 'civil status' shares a curious aspect with
'nationality': they have been created by law and their very purpose is to facilitate the
unequal treatment of persons. Accordingly unequal treatment on the basis of civil status
carries a semblance ofjustification (even human rights treaties support the idea that getting
married should be socially and legally relevant). Nevertheless, the European Court of
Human Rights has held that 'very weighty reasons' would have to be put forward before a
difference of treatment on the ground of nationality (Gaygusuz, judgement of 16 September
1996, par. 42) or illegitimacy (lnze,judgement of 28 October 1987, Series A, Vol. 126, par.
41) could be regarded as compatible with the European Convention. The only other
ground for which the Court has so far required 'very weighty reasons' is sex ((1bdulaz:iz,
judgement of 28 May 1985, Series A, Vol. 94, par. 78; Schuler-<:,graggen, judgement of 24June
1993, Series A, Vol. 263, par. 67; Bwghartz,judgement of 22 February 1994, Series A, Vol.
280-B, par. 27). It may safely be assumed that the Court would say the same about race.
The common characteristic of these suspect grounds is that for most people they are
inescapable givens. This certainly is true for the civil status of illegitimacy. Therefore it may
be argued that other civil statuses which are involuntary given to the persons concerned
should also be ranked as suspect grounds of discrimination. Thus in the case of someone
with a same-sex partner the status of not being married would be a suspect ground,
requiring very weighty reasons ofjustification.
Given the still complete ban on same-sex marriage (m itself discrimination on the basis of
sex/gender and of sexual orientation, although even the Dutch Supreme Court did not
draw that conclusion, Hoge Raad19 October 1990,NederlandseJurisprudentie 1992, 129, but
perhaps the Hawaii Supreme Court will in the pending case of Baehr v. Lewin), direct
discrimination against unmarried individuals (i.e. against non-marital relationships) always
amounts to indirect discrimination against homosexual relationships. It also amounts to
indirect discrimination against homosexual individuals (who are not barmed from
marriage, but from marrying a person of their preferred gender). In the Netherlands this is
gradually becoming more accepted in case law (seefor example the judgement of the Court
of Appeal of Amsterdam of6 May 1993, NederlandseJurisprudentie 1994, or. 681; and the
Dutch Equal Treatment Commission's opinions 96-52 of 20June 1996 and 97-38 of 14
April 1997, great improvements on its hesitant opinion 95-42 of 23 November 1995,
&chtspraakNemesis 1996, or. 550; still hesitant is the main Dutch court for immigration
cases, Rechtbank Den Haag, 23 October 1997, Migrantmrecht 1997, nr. 130).
Conversely, it could be claimed that direct discrimination against homosexuals or
against same-sex relationships amounts to indirect discrimination against the unmarried. In
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situations where either sexual orientation or civil status is excluded from a list of forbidden
grounds for discrimination, it may therefore be practical to argue indirect discrimination
on the other ground.
But even where both grounds are included in the list (or implied by the open ended
character of the list), something can be gained from arguing indirect sexual orientation
discrimination in cases of direct civil status discrimination. Complaints about
discrimination against unmarried couples have been frequently dismissed on the basis of
arguments which seem not completely irrational as far as heterosexual couples are
concerned: cohabitees are deemed to have chosen not to get married; in the absence of
marriage it would be difficult to establish who is with whom; like being married, living
together outside marriage carries a more or less balanced bundle of advantages and
disadvantages. Such arguments may sometimes be considered to offer sufficient justification
for treating unmarried heterosexuals less favourably than married heterosexuals. But in
relation to (unmarried) homosexuals they do not justify anything: they have not been able
to choose (not) to get married; they have been denied a legal mechanism to prove their
'being together'; and they might have preferred the other bundle.
Precisely because of the marital bundle of legal consequences and because of the
evidential value of marriage (not to mention its symbolic meanings), it can be argued that
the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation (about which a consensus is
growing in the western world) requires national legislatures to provide same-sex couples
with a similar choice of civil statuses as is available for different-sex couples.
In some jurisdictions (Denmark and Greenland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, the
Netherlands and Hawaii) a new civil status has recently been created for that purpose: the
status of registered partner. This status entails almost all of the legal consequences of being
married. (Given the symbolic importance of marriage, it is doubtful whether this
compromise of 'same rights, different status' effectively ends the anti-homosexual
discrimination of marriage law.) Consequently the civil status of not being married has lost
most of its legal meaning: people now are either married, or registered, or neither married
nor registered. Although in one country - the Netherlands - different-sex partners are
admitted to registered partnership (sinceJanuary 1998; during the first three months 409
heterosexual couples registered their partnership), this new status is basically a homosexual
equivalent to heterosexual marriage (In the three months sinceJanuary 1998, 304 female
and 522 male couples registered their partnership in the Netherlands; since 1989 around
2000 same-sex couples have registered their partnership in Denmark). Because of this
(predominantly) homosexual nature of registered partnership, any distinction with
marriage does not only amount to direct discrimination based on civil status but also to
direct discrimination based on sexual orientation. (This conclusion is of particular
relevance injurisdictions where civil status discrimination is not explicitly prohibited.) The
main distinctions between partnership and marriage made in the Scandinavian and Dutch
laws relate to foreign partners, to the position of children, and to pensions for widows and
widowers. Such distinctions cannot be justified by the traditional justifications for the
unfavourable treatment of non-marital relationships (see above).
As civil status illegitimacy seems to be on the way out (as a criterion in inheritance law it
was virtually invalidated by the European Court of Human Rights in its March judgement
of 13June 1997, Series A, Vol. 31; as a legal term it was abolished in Dutch law on 1 April
1998). Biology is becoming a more important criterion in classifying children than whether
or not their parents were married.
However, where biological ties are absent between a child and at least one of the
persons who are bringing it up, the sex, sexual orientation and/or civil status of (the
relationship of) these persons is still often decisive for the treatment of the child. The
persons who are in fact bringing up a child, may be called social parents. Three situations of
non-biological social parenting can be distinguished: a child is being brought up by a new
partner of its father or mother (step-parenting), or a child is born without biological input
of the partner of its mother (this situation arises typically from artificial insemination, and
can be called co-parenting), or a child is brought up by others than its father and mother
(foster-parenting). Whereas children in (married) heterosexual families can (through
adoption or otherwise) see their step-, co- or foster-parents become full kgalparents, this is
generally not possible for a child in a family of same-sex parents. The absence of legal
parenthood in such situations can lead to all kinds of disadvantages for the child, for
example with regard to maintenance, inheritance, orphan's allowances, etc. These
disadvantages may be challenged as indirect discrimination based on the sex, sexual
orientation or civil status of the relationship of the social parents. I submit that they can
also be challenged as direct discrimination based on the civil status of the child: that of not
being a legal child of one or both social parent(s). Whether or not one counts as a legal
child of a social parent, should be included in the notion of civil status. The March
judgement (see above) has demonstrated that discrimination between different legal
categories of biological children should be countered. In the interest of children it is equally
important to fight discrimination between different legal categories of social children.
Points for discussion:
1. Civil status should be seen as a suspect discrimination ground (requiring very weighty
reasons for justification) in all situations where the person discriminated against has not
opted voluntarily for that particular status.
2. Discrimination between marriage and registered partnership should be seen as direct
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
3. Parenthood (i.e. whether or not one counts as a legal child of one's social or biological
parent) should be recognised as civil status.
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